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Turkey and Greece are again dragged into a new conflict in the East 
Mediterranean. Turkey and Greece vie for supremacy in the eastern 
Mediterranean. Turkey, for its part, indicated that Greece's claim to the 
territory would amount to a siege in the country by giving Greece a 
disproportionate amount of territory. This study aims to rethink the 
conflict between Greece and Turkey in the waters of the Mediterranean 
sea in the view of international maritime law. This study uses an 
empirical juridical approach. The Result of this research is Turkey does 
not ignore the Greece rights, Greece ignores the international law with 
its extended or excessive maritime claims. Greece tries to give full 
entitlement of the islands in Mediterranean and Agean. Whereas the 
effect Formula is applied by international courts. 
 
Turki dan Yunani kembali terseret ke dalam konflik baru di Mediterania 
Timur. Turki dan Yunani bersaing memperebutkan supremasi di 
Mediterania timur. Turki, pada bagiannya, menunjukkan bahwa klaim 
Yunani atas wilayah itu akan berarti pengepungan di negara itu dengan 
memberi Yunani sejumlah wilayah yang tidak proporsional. Penelitian 
ini bertujuan untuk memikirkan kembali konflik antara Yunani dan Turki 
di perairan laut Mediterania dalam pandangan hukum maritim 
internasional. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan yuridis empiris. 
Hasil penelitian ini adalah Turki tidak mengabaikan hak-hak Yunani, 
Yunani mengabaikan hukum internasional dengan klaim maritim yang 
diperpanjang atau berlebihan. Yunani mencoba memberikan hak penuh 
atas pulau-pulau di Mediterania dan Agean. Sedangkan Formula efek 
diterapkan oleh pengadilan internasional. 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
The tense relationship between Turkey and Greece is one of the 
oldest conflicts in the history of the world. Since 1999 until now, the two 
countries' international relations have never met harmony. Starting from 
issues about the Aegean, Cyprus, minority issues, to now issues regarding 
oil and gas exploration in the Mediterranean sea.1 The Greco-Turkish conflict 
after the Second World War was a Cyprus issue from the 1950s onwards. 
                                                          
1    Ahmed Jassim Ibrahim Hamid, Turkish - Greek conflict In light of the international situation 
1960-1994 (historical study), Journal Of Babylon Center For Humanities Studies, Volume 6 






The second objective conflict is the complicated Aegean difference, which 
includes at least six differences in disagreement. The minority question is 
also a constant point of friction issues related to the Patriarchate in Istanbul.  
At this time Turkey and Greece are again dragged into a new conflict 
which makes the European Union obliged to think about preventive 
measures. Tensions between Greece and Turkey have resumed due to 
resource extraction in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, when the Greek 
government attacked Turkey after announcing renewed exploration drilling 
in waters around Cyprus. The Greek military is on standby as Prime Minister 
Kyriakos Mitsotakis brings together the government's national security 
council to discuss Turkey's decision to send the research vessel Oruc Reis, 
along with two additional ships, to contested waters in August 2020. The 
Greek government will not accept deep pressure. whatever form and will 
defend the sovereignty and security rights in the area.2 
Tensions between Greece and Turkey in the Mediterranean Sea 
began in November 2019. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed 
an agreement with Libya's UN-recognized Government of National Accord 
(GNA). The treaty initiates the maritime boundaries of the two countries in 
the Mediterranean Sea. These boundaries are defined as the exclusive 
economic zone. This means that both countries, both Turkey and Libya have 
exclusive rights to exploit the oil and gas contained therein.3 
Turkey and Greece vie for supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean. 
Turkey, for its part, indicated that Greece's claim to the territory would 
amount to a siege in the country by giving Greece a disproportionate 
amount of territory.4 Greece argues that the islands of the Aegean Sea could 
provide their own Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that would allow Greece 
to explore 200 nautical miles of Mediterranean waters. Turkey considers that 
the islands cannot have their own EEZ and Greece's EEZ must start from the 
mainland, not from hundreds of islands. Turkey, which has a significant 
coastline, will be denied rights to waters only a few kilometers from the 
mainland.5 
The Exclusive Economic Zone is governed by the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which was signed in 1982. 
Turkey never signed the Treaty, although it has used certain principles 
thereof to settle all maritime claims with state's Black Sea. The US, Peru, 
and Colombia are among the countries that have not ratified the UNCLOS 
agreement either. 
Tensions in the East Mediterranean are not new, with NATO allies 
and neighbors Greece and Turkey on the brink of war over issues no less 
                                                          
2 Turkey-Greece tensions escalate over Turkish Med drilling plans, BBC News, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53497741accessed on 13 September 2020. 
3    Ibid. 
4   A.N. Atrashkevich,Turkey and Greece:Political and Economic Relations within the Conflict 
Circumstances (1999—2017), Vestnik RUDN International Relations, Volume 19 Number 4, 
2019, Page. 676 
5   Sfetas Spyridon, The legacy of the Treaty of Lausanne in the light of Greek-Turkish relations 
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than three times since the 1970s.6 Competing efforts over drilling rights in a 
region, which has seen a surge in oil and gas exploration in the past decade, 
is only the latest in a series of disputes spanning four decades. This study 
aims to rethink the conflict between Greece and Turkey in the waters of the 
Mediterranean sea in the view of international maritime law. 
 
B. RESEARCH METHOD 
This study uses an empirical juridical approach, it  used to solve the 
problem with predominantly first researching primary data in the field then 
followed by research on existing secondary data.7 This research will produce 
descriptive reports in the form of written or oral data from the object of 
research holistically (intact). 
 
C. DISCUSSION AND RESULTS 
1. Exclusive Economic Zone InUnclos (United Nations Convention 
For The Law Of The Sea) 
The Exclusive Economic Zone is a zone no more than 200 in 
width nautical miles calculated from the baseline. In this Exclusive 
Economic Zone, the coastal state has exclusive sovereign rights for the 
purposes of exploration and exploitation of natural resources as well as 
certain jurisdiction over the creation and use of artificial islands, 
installations and structures. Marine scientific research, and. Protection 
and preservation of the marine environment.8 
The Exclusive Economic Zone is measured when sea water is 
receding. In the Exclusive Economic Zone there is the right to regulate all 
exploration activities as well as exploitation of natural resources at sea 
level, on the seabed as well as under the sea, as well as to conduct 
research on biological resources and other marine resources.9 In the 
Exclusive Economic Zone which covers 200 miles, the coastal state has 
the right to natural resources in the sea area and also has the right to 
use its legal policies, freedom of navigation to fly over it or to plant 
cables and pipes.10 The boundary in the Exclusive Economic Zone is the 
outer boundary of the territorial sea. This outer boundary zone shall not 
exceed the ocean 200 miles from the baseline over which the area of the 
territorial coast has been determined. The statement in this provision 
suggests that 200 miles is the maximum limit of the Exclusive Economic 
                                                          
6  Elena Becatoros, Suzan Fraser, Nato: Turkey, Greece Start Talks To Reduce Risk Of Conflict, 
AP News https://apnews.com/568155857d077542a2fce289ab2a26e1accessed on 13 
September 2020 
7 Melissa P. Johnston, Secondary Data Analysis: A Method of which the Time Has Come, 
Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Libraries (QQML), 3rdedition,  December 2013, Page. 
620 
8  Jing Geng, The Legality of Foreign Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone under 
UNCLOS, Merkourios Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, Volume 28 Issue 
74, 2012. Page. 24 
9  M Lehto, ‗Restrictions on Military Activities in the Baltic Sea – A Basis for a Regional Regime? 
2 Finnish YB Int‘l L,‘ ,1991,  Page. 38, 45;  
10  Adrianus A. V. Ramon, The Legality Of Foreign Peacetime Military Activities In The Exclusive 






Zone. This provides a provision that if there is a coastal country that 
wants its EEZ area to be smaller than that, then that country can submit 
it.11 
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a marine area owned by a 
coastal state and its international arrangements are regulated in the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982 where the EEZ 
is specifically regulated in Chapter V Articles 55 to Article 75 Convention 
or known as UNCLOS III in 1982.12 The Exclusive Economic Zone which 
is located outside the territorial sea is determined to be 200 miles wide, 
measured from the baseline which in accordance with the provisions 
contained in Article 57 UNCLOS 1982 is divided into two types, namely a 
normal base line and a straight base line. 13 
Ordinary baselines are the lines drawn at low tide farthest from 
the coast, while straight baselines are the lines drawn by connecting the 
outer points of the outer islands. Outward of the baseline, a country can 
establish a maximum territorial sea width of 12 miles. In this regard, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 57, the actual width of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone is 188 miles (200 miles minus 12 miles).14 The 
determination of the boundaries of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
between one country whose coast is opposite or adjacent to another 
country must be regulated by an international agreement.15 If an 
agreement is not reached, the dispute settlement must be pursued in 
accordance with Chapter XV, which basically implies peaceful settlement. 
The boundary line of the Exclusive Economic Zone must be indicated on 
a map with a sufficient scale, where it is necessary to include a list of 
points of geographical coordinates detailing the geodetic datum.16 
The coastal State shall declare as appropriate the map or list of 
geographic coordinates and shall deposit a copy of each map with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with the 
provisions contained in Article 75 UNCLOS II.17 The rights of the coastal 
state in its EEZ are in the form of sovereign rights for the right to 
explore, namely the inventory of natural resources in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone, the right to exploit, namely carrying out management 
and utilization of natural resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone, and 
the right to carry out activities. conservation, namely activities that are 
protective in order to maintain the availability of reserves of living natural 
resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone.18 
                                                          
11  Ibid 
12  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra no. 5, Article 55 
13  Ibid, Article 57 
14  Stephen Rose, Naval activity in the exclusive economic zone—Troubled waters ahead?, 21 
Ocean Development & International Law 123 (2), 1990, Page. 120 
15  Francesco Francioni, Peacetime use of Force, Military Activities, and the New Law of the 
Sea, Cornell International Law, 1985, Page. 203 
16  Ibid. 
17  UNCLOS article 75 
18  Katarzyna Skrzeszewska, TihomirLuković, Ivo Šperanda, Comparative Analysis Of Polish And 
CroatianMaritime Policy In The Context Of The Integrated Maritime Policy Of The European 
Union, Contemporary Economy, Volume 7 No. 4, 2016, Page. 70 
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Meanwhile in the EEZ, other countries have the freedom to sail 
and fly, the right to lay cables and pipes, installations and buildings in 
accordance with the provisions of the law of the sea regarding the 
Continental Shelf and the EEZ, the freedoms of the high seas mentioned 
in Articles 88 to 115, covering various fields related to ships and 
shipping, and access to fisheries surplus that are not utilized by the 
coastal state.19 The Coastal State has sovereign rights and special 
jurisdiction to explore and exploit non-living natural resources contained 
in the continental shelf. This is regulated in the provisions of Chapter IV 
contained in Article 76 to Article 85 UNCLOS III concerning the 
continental shelf. The provisions in UNCLOS III have reinforced and 
confirmed the provisions of the continental shelf.  
The 1945 Truman proclamation regarding the continental shelf 
shook the world at that time, especially the world of international law. 
Given the previous state practices that also seek to impart similar tenure 
rights over natural resources contained in the seabed and submarine 
land bordering its coasts, it is not surprising that this action by the 
United States was followed by other countries. The first country to follow 
the example of the United States was Mexico which was followed the 
following year by Panama and Argentina in a declaration of 9 October 
1946 declaring sovereignty, followed by the Declaration of Chile (June 
1947), Peru (1 August 1947), and Costa Rica (27 July 1948) which 
extends even further because it claims sovereignty over the continental 
shelf and the sea bordering its shores up to 200 miles from the coast.20 
These declarations were followed by other countries outside the 
American continent, such as Britain, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, 
Pakistan and the Philippines. The provisions of Article 76 paragraph (1) 
UNCLOS III contain the definition of the continental base that the 
Continental Shelf of a coastal state includes the seabed and the land 
beneath it from the area below sea level which lies outside its territorial 
sea along the natural continuation of the land area to the outer edge of 
the continental edge, or up to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the 
baseline from which the width of the territorial sea is measured in the 
event that the outer edges of the continental edge do not reach that 
distance.21 
The provisions of Article 76 paragraph (4) through the provisions 
of Article 76 paragraph (7) stipulate that if the continental shelf exceeds 
the 200 nautical mile distance limit, the maximum width of the 
continental shelf is 350 miles from the baseline from which the width of 
the territorial sea is measured, provided that the outer limit of the shelf 
The continent is defined based on the provisions contained in the 
convention.15 The determination of the outer boundaries of the 
                                                          
19  Ibid. 
20 Sébastien KiwonghiBizawu, Denise Sousa Sousa, The Law of the Sea a its Effective in 
International Context: An Analysis of Liability for Damages Caused in the Marine 
Environment, Revista de Direito Ambiental eSocioambientalismo, Volume No. 1, 2016, Page. 
255 






continental shelf is very important, because under the provisions of 
Article 76, a coastal state has the right to a continental shelf exceeding 
200 nautical miles measured from its base line. This is known as the 
Extension Continental Shelf (LKE). The coastal state must delineate the 
outer boundaries of this EFI and submit it to the Commission on the 
Limits of Continental Shelf through the Secretary General of the United 
Nations (UN). The procedure for submitting an Existence Continental 
Shelf is regulated in Article 76 paragraph (8) and paragraph (9) of the 
1982 Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) which states that the outer 
boundary of the continent must be submitted to the Commission on the 
Boundary of the Continental Shelf. This continental shelf has 
extraordinary natural wealth. This fact is the basis for states to claim 
exclusive rights over exploitation of this territory. The coastal state has 
the right to exploit and explore its natural resources in accordance with 
the provisions contained in Article 77 UNCLOS III. And, according to the 
same article, it is stated if the right is exclusive so that in the event of a 
desire from another country to undertake exploitation or exploration, it 
must first obtain a permit from the coastal state. 
 
2. Turkey’s Maritime Delimitation on Mediterania Sea. 
Turkey already observes almost all other principles of UNCLOS 
and has extended its territorial waters to 12 miles in the Black Sea and 
the Mediterranean Sea. Still, though, any possible litigation either at 
ITLOS or at ICJ of any maritime dispute between Greece and Turkey 
may not happen without mutual consent of both parties. In the absence 
of a binding treaty law, Turkey has no peaceful recourse to resolve 
disputes of Territorial Waters, CS or EEZs other than bilateral 
negotiations with Greece.22 In addition, it is important that a non-party 
to UNCLOS not only declines the treaty provision that would be contrary 
to its interests, but must also reject any tacit acceptance or acquiescence 
to a particular maritime delimitation, in order to avoid being bound to it 
as a custom in the future. In this regard, Turkey often conducts naval 
exercises as an instrument of gunboat diplomacy and grants seismic 
research rights for oil & gas exploration activities in its potential EEZs 
within close proximity of Kastellorizo and Cyprus islands as a way to 
demonstrate its refusal to accept Greek and Greek Cypriot claims to EEZs 
Resolution of the EEZ delimitation dispute in the eastern Mediterranean 
is of crucial importance for the region‘s security and economic 
prosperity.23 If Kastellorizo is given full EEZ, Greece will have a maritime 
border with Cyprus and gain a strategic advantage that benefits the 
emerging Greece-Cyprus-Israel alliance by making it possible to transport 
offshore natural gas from Levant to Western Europe, thus bypassing 
                                                          
22 Petros Siousiouras and Georgios Chrysochou, The Aegean Dispute in the Context of 
Contemporary Judicial Decisions on Maritime Delimitation, Laws, Volume 3 No. 1, January 
2014. Page. 14 
23 Veniamin Karakostanoglou, Coastal State Rights in the EEZ: Challenges and Perspectives for 
the Aegean Sea, The Aegean Sea and the New Law of the Sea, Volume 4 No 6, November 
1994, Page. 32 
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Turkey as a transit hub, despite the latter being the more economically 
feasible route. Turkey denies the claim that Kastellorizo is entitled to full 
EEZ and insists on bilateral negotiations to resolve the dispute, while 
Greece would like the issue settled in the ITLOS.24 
UNCLOS introduced the principle of ―equitable solution‖ in place 
of ―equidistance rule‖ as a basis to arbitrate maritime delimitations, 
which strengthened Turkey‘s position. The treaty gives consideration to 
proportionality of the length of adjacent coastlines in adjusting an 
equidistance line for maritime delimitation. Nevertheless, as a non-party 
to the treaty, Turkey may not appeal to ITLOS or ICJ for arbitration 
without a mutual consent with Greece and certainly not with Cyprus due 
to the issue of diplomatic non-recognition. This lack of legal and political 
instruments to settle the dispute has been a major cause of concern for 
thought circles at home in Turkey and abroad. In essence, Turkey‘s legal 
position is based on the ―equity‖ principle that calls for consideration of 
special circumstances surrounding the well-positioned island of 
Kastellorizo and the adjacent, disadvantaged Turkish mainland. 
Kastellorizo‘s size, distance to mainland Greece, and relative length of 
total coastline has an undoubtedly disproportionate effect on a potential 
EEZ delimitation. Under these circumstances, Turkey defends the view 
that ―proportionality‖ and ―non-encroachment‖ rules as applied by ICJ in 
Ukraine-Romania maritime dispute resolution case should govern the EEZ 
delimitation with Greece in the Mediterranean Sea.25 
It is acknowledged by all parties to the dispute that delimitation 
of maritime zones will be a decisive step towards regional stability. 
Furthermore, international law stipulates that maritime delimitation in a 
semi-closed sea like the eastern Mediterranean should be done in the 
view of equitable principles and relevant circumstances with cooperation 
and consent of all littoral states, not the least of which are those with the 
longest stretch of coastlines – Turkey, Egypt, and Libya. In the case of 
marked disparity between ratios of respective coastal lengths, 
delimitation in contested waters should be affected by supremacy of 
physical geography based on the principle that ―land dominates the 
sea‖.26 
The ICJ emphasized this principle on its decisions over the 
Aegean Sea and North Sea Continental Shelf cases in 1969 and 1978. 
Accordingly, Turkey‘s view is that delimitation should be done on 
geometrically objective basis by mutual agreement between adjacent 
states, which, in the mean time, should refrain from imposing maritime 
boundaries unilaterally as per UN Charter I, Article 2. 
On the north-south axis, Turkey and Egypt have a potential to 
realize the longest adjacent EEZs. If Kastellorizo, as a populated island 
                                                          
24 Ibid. 
25 Petros Siousiouras, Op.cit. 17 
26 Byron Theodoropoulos, 1997,  ―The So-Called Aegean Dispute: What Are the Stakes? What 
Is the Cost?‖ In Greece and the Law of the Sea. Edited by Theodore C. Kariotis. The Hague: 






with economic activity, is given full influence in maritime delimitation as 
per Article 121 of UNCLOS, Greece may encroach upon the area and 
have a common border with Cyprus on the east-west axis. This would be 
illicit in the interests of equity for Turkey and Egypt, because the general 
direction of coastlines in the semi-closed Mediterranean Sea is on the 
east-west axis. Maritime delimitation between opposite coastal states 
should be done on the north-south axis by priority to prevent 
encroachment into EEZs of third parties. It would, furthermore, be an 
unfounded attempt to redraw the map as though Greek islands of 
Kastellorizo, Rhodes, Karpathos and Crete constitute a contiguous 
national frontier facing eastward. Each and every island should be 
accorded treatment based to its own unique circumstances, since Greece 
is not an ―archipelagic state‖ and may not be entitled to ―draw straight 
baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands.27 
20.7% of Turkey‘s coastline is on the Mediterranean Sea and is 
832 miles in length. The segment between Marmaris and Antalya that is 
opposite to the west coast of Cyprus is 656 miles, which is more than 
even the total  coastline of Cyprus – 402 miles – including the Turkish 
part in the north. By comparison, the western coast of Cyprus is only 32 
miles long. In Libya-Malta case, the ICJ adjusted the median line by 18 
miles to the north against Malta in accordance with equitable principles 
of proportionality to reflect the lengths of the relevant parts of each 
state‘s coastlines. In doing so, nor did it take into account arguments 
about oil reserves and economic disparity. Given the more than 20 times 
difference in coastal length between Cyprus and Turkey, it would be a 
gross act of negligence to overlook equitable rights and to let the 
―equidistance‖ line be the rule that governs EEZ delimitation. Moreover, 
maritime delimitation between Cyprus and Egypt, Israel, Lebanon must 
be adjusted to establish a proportionate distribution of EEZ areas, and to 
prevent loss of over 30.000 km2 of sea area to Cyprus. 
Safe access to high seas and the underlying economic resources 
of the seabed are of key significance for Turkey‘s health and well-being. 
The Mediterranean Sea is host to 1/3 of world‘smaritime transport99 and 
is a vital route for Turkey‘s foreign trade. Although the EU and Turkey 
have had a symbiotic economic relationship and their trade volume is 
once again on the rise, Turkey‘s membership negotiations with the union 
are at stalemate primarily due to the Cyprus Problem. Therefore, thanks 
to the government‘s diversification strategy and bilateral foreign trade 
agreements with developing nations of Middle East and Africa, Turkey's 
robust growth even in the face of economic turmoil in Europe led the two 
rating agencies to upgrade Turkey's debt to investment grade in 2012 
and 2013.101 In particular, container traffic and energy trade via the 
ports of Antalya, Mersin, and Iskenderun became crucial to sustain the 
country‘s economic growth performance of 3-4% per annum. 
Inasmuch as rival claims for EEZs in the eastern Mediterranean 
illustrate the substantial risk of escalation for crisis, there are 
                                                          
27 Petros Siousiouras, op.Cit. Page.18 
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opportunities to expand the pie and create mutually beneficial 
partnerships among neighbors. In Cyprus, independent confidence-
building moves such as treatment of gas finds as a common heritage of 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots, possibly distributed through a UN-supervised 
arrangement, would ease the tensions and could offer Cypriot gas access 
to a growing market with relatively high import prices in Turkey. In terms 
of the cost element, although there is reason to believe that a pipeline to 
Turkey would probably entail lower development costs than other 
proposed monetization options, as long as the Cyprus Problem persists it 
would hinder rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, and might 
render regional energy projects unprofitable in the face of downward 
price pressure from alternative sources such as the U.S. shale gas. 
 
3. Intervention in Greece's interests to the Turkish maritime 
boundary. 
In a conflict, the involvement of a third party by intervening is 
usually carried out in several actions. The form of intervention carried 
out by third parties in a conflict is not only in the form of intervention 
using military forces, but can provide a neutral stance and assist in the 
distribution process of resources and not in the form of weapons 
distribution. From these actions, there are a number of actions that the 
Greek government has also taken, such as by helping weaponry by 
sending military personnel to the Mediterranean sea area. Interventions 
carried out by other countries in this conflict can be motivated by a 
number of reasons. instrumental motives related to state involvement in 
other state conflicts. 
The state's instrumental motives are more directed to the 
political and economic motives of the state related to interests. The 
instrumental motives include international political considerations, 
economic advancement, domestic politics, and military interests. With 
the motive behind the participation of other countries in the conflict, the 
presence of third parties in the conflict can cause prolonged conflict and 
does not support the acceleration of the conflict resolution process.28 
Although Greece and Turkey have agreed to increase trade 
cooperation between the two countries, Greece and Turkey do not yet 
have an agreement on drilling rights in the Aegean sea.29 The agreement 
with the European Union regarding the provision of alternative energy 
sources after the reduction of Russian gas supplies that moved to Asian 
markets via China and Russia's involvement in the Ukraine conflict. The 
European market's need for Russian gas supplies is enormous. Russia's 
agreement with China regarding meeting gas demand in China reduces 
the gas supply rate provided by Russia to the European market. This is 
                                                          
28   ΚostasOikonomidis., 1998,  International Law and Greek Foreign Policy Issues (in Greek). 
Athens: Sakkoulasp. 53. 
29 Sinan Kiyanç, Abd MerkeziİstihbaratTeşkilati (Cia) ArşivBelgelerineGöreEgeSorunu, 







what drives the need for energy supplies from other sources provided by 
the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern markets through Greece. Greece's 
desire to become an anchor for oil and gas supplies from the 
Mediterranean and African regions will certainly benefit Greece's position 
in the region. By having the power to supply resources, Greece can take 
an important position for the European Union. From a geo-economic 
perspective, it is conveyed about the emergence of a struggle for control 
over resources, especially oil and gas. The control of these resources is 
related to the country's geopolitical strategy in expanding its influence.30 
Territorial control cannot be separated from control of the 
resources contained in the area. So that control of resources in an 
economic context can also increase the influence of countries in the 
region and the world. In the view of classical geoeconomics, the struggle 
for resources contained in an area can occur in adjacent areas. Conflict 
over territorial seizure and permits for oil and gas drilling in 
Mediterranean waters is proof that the wealth of energy sources in the 
Pebatasan region can trigger violent conflict, especially if the energy 
source is in the EEZ region. Apart from being related to territorial 
disputes, access to energy sources can also be a cause for the use of 
violence in the struggle for resources. If one party impedes access to 
existing resources. Then there is also a disputed factor over allocation 
when there are two neighboring countries collaborating in resource 
exploration and the allocation process is not in accordance with the 
agreement. The last is the profit sharing factor. Profits to be gained from 




Most of the Mediterranean states have signed and ratified 
International Regulations governing International Maritime Boundaries; 
those that have not include Morocco and Libya (which have signed but not 
ratified) and Israel, Syria and Turkey. Both sides are not parties of these 
convention but that not mean they dont have any right of maritime 
jurisdiction. Turkey and Libya as two mainland countries which opposite 
have the rights of territorial sea, continental shelf and EEZ and other 
maritime jurisdictions. Turkey is not ignoring the Greece, Greece tries to 
dismiss Turkey‘s maritime jurisdiction in Mediterranean. Because Greece 
claims EEZ in Mediterraenan, showing map such as maritime boundaries are 
drawn, tries to give entitlement to whole islands before the viable solution 
of the maritime delimitation with Turkey, acting to draw the maritime 
boundaries by the way of cutting off the open seas of Turkey. In the case of 
Libya and Turkey relations on maritime delimitation, no doubt is that 
continental shelf is an ipso facto and ab initio, due to the sovereign rights of 
                                                          
30   SamimAkgönül, Les relations gréco-turques au tournant du siècle : ruptures, évolutions et 
permanences, Cahiers Balkaniques, 33th edition 2004, Page.20-21 
31 KraterosIoannou, 1989, The Jurisdictional Factor in the Greco-Turkish Relations, in 
International Law and in Hellenic Foreign Policy (in Greek). Komotini: Sakkoulas, Page. 234 
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Turkey and Libya.  Equidistance method of delimitation can not be drawn 
without taken into consideration relevant circumstances. Various 
methodologies shall be determined in accordance with equitable principles 
which stated in the International Law Commission of the United Nations. In 
the light of this report of Commission, it is clear that the notion of 
equidstance or median line could not taken alone which never really 
envisaged to dismiss the relevant circumstances. At the end, Turkey does 
not ignore the Greece rights, Greece ignores the international law with its 
extended or excessive maritime claims. Greece tries to give full entitlement 
of the islands in Mediterranean and Agean. Whereas the effect Formula is 
applied by international courts. Despite of the 1982 Convention states that 
islands have the right to territorial sea, contigious zone, continental shelf 
and exclusive economic zone, these entitlements to the island creates 





Byron Theodoropoulos, 1997,  ―The So-Called Aegean Dispute: What Are the 
Stakes? What Is the Cost?‖ In Greece and the Law of the Sea. 
Edited by Theodore C. Kariotis. The Hague: MartinusNijhoff 
Publishers; 
ΚostasOikonomidis. , 1998,  International Law and Greek Foreign Policy 
Issues (in Greek). Athens:Sakkoulasp; 
KraterosIoannou, 1989, The Jurisdictional Factor in the Greco-Turkish 
Relations, in International Law and in Hellenic Foreign Policy (in 
Greek). Komotini: Sakkoulas; 
M Lehto,1991, ‗Restrictions on Military Activities in the Baltic Sea – A Basis 
for a Regional Regime? 2 Finnish YB International; 
Stephen Rose, 1990, Naval activity in the exclusive economic zone—
Troubled watersahead?, 21 Ocean Development & International 
Law 123; 
B. Journal 
Adrianus A. V. Ramon, The Legality Of Foreign Peacetime Military Activities 
In The Exclusive Economic Zone Of Another State, Veritas et 
Justitia, Volume 3 No. 2, 2017; 
Ahmed Jassim Ibrahim Hamid, Turkish - Greek conflict In light of the 
international situation 1960-1994 (historical study), Journal Of 
Babylon Center For Humanities Studies, Volume 6 Number 1, 2016; 
A.N. Atrashkevich,Turkey and Greece:Political and Economic Relations within 
the Conflict Circumstances (1999—2017), Vestnik RUDN 






Francesco Francioni, Peacetime use of Force, Military Activities, and the New 
Law of the Sea, Cornell International Law, 1985; 
Jing Geng, The Legality of Foreign Military Activities in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone under UNCLOS, Merkourios Utrecht Journal of 
International and European Law, Volume 28 Issue 74, 2012; 
Katarzyna Skrzeszewska, TihomirLuković, Ivo Šperanda, Comparative 
Analysis Of Polish And Croatian Maritime Policy In The Context Of 
The Integrated Maritime Policy Of The European Union, 
Contemporary Economy, Volume 7 No. 4, 2016; 
Melissa P. Johnston, Secondary Data Analysis: A Method of which the Time 
Has Come, Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Libraries 
(QQML), 3rd edition,  December 2013; 
Petros Siousiouras and Georgios Chrysochou, The Aegean Dispute in the 
Context of Contemporary Judicial Decisions on Maritime 
Delimitation, Laws, Volume 3 No. 1, January 2014; 
SamimAkgönül, Les relations gréco-turques au tournant du siècle : ruptures, 
évolutions et permanences, Cahiers Balkaniques, 33th edition 
2004; 
Sébastien KiwonghiBizawu, Denise Sousa Sousa, The Law of the Sea a its 
Effective in International Context: An Analysis of Liability for 
Damages Caused in the Marine Environment, Revista de Direito 
Ambiental e Socioambientalismo, Volume No. 1, 2016; 
Sfetas Spyridon, The legacy of the Treaty of Lausanne in the light of Greek-
Turkish relations in the twentieth century: Greek perceptions of the 
Treaty of Lausanne, Balcania, 2015 
Sinan Kiyanç, Abd MerkeziİstihbaratTeşkilati (Cia) Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Ege 
Sorunu, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 
Volume 22 No. 1, March 2020; 
Veniamin Karakostanoglou, Coastal State Rights in the EEZ: Challenges and 
Perspectives for the Aegean Sea, The Aegean Sea and the New 
Law of the Sea, Volume 4 No 6, November 1994; 
C. Legislation 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II) 1960 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) 1967 
D. Web 
Elena Becatoros, Suzan Fraser, Nato: Turkey, Greece Start Talks To Reduce 
Risk Of Conflict, AP  
 Newshttps://apnews.com/568155857d077542a2fce289ab2a26e1  
accessed on 13 September 2020 
Turkey-Greece tensions escalate over Turkish Med drilling plans, BBC News, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53497741 accessed on 
13 September 2020. 
P-ISSN: 1412-2723 
 
138 |  
 
 
 
 
 
